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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
JOHN RICHARD MARK MILLER, 
Defendan t-Appe Hant. 
Case No. 
11723 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant, John Richard Mark Miller, appeals 
from a conviction of issuing a check against insuf-
ficient funds in Third District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On the 17th day of March, 1969, appellant, John 
Richard Mdrk Miller, was found guilty of issuing a 
check against insufficient funds by a jury in Third 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah; whereupon, 
appGllant, on the 7th day of April, 1969, appeared 
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before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, District Court 
for sentencing, and appellant was sentenced to the 
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as pro-
vided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction, a 
setting aside of the sentence and an order awarding 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 16, 1968, defendant, John Richard 
Mark Miller, wrote a check (State's Ex. 1) for $95.00 
against Walker Bank & Trust Co., University Branch, 
Salt Lake City, to the Deseret Inn, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, in settlement of a bi.11 for the motel's services 
and some cash. (T. 52) The check was written in the 
presence of the motel's employee, Erma Gelruth, 
(T-52) and it was later returned. (T-52) Further, it was 
established that no account existed at the Walker 
Bank, Sugarhouse Branch in January, 1968, in the 
name of John R. Miller or J. R. Miller. (T-61) Also, ac· 
cording to Harry Croyle, Operations Officer at the 
involved bank, and based on the account number 
of State's Ex. 1, an account had existed for J. R. Mil-
ler but was closed by the bank in May, 1966. How-
ever, theJast account in that bank held by the name 
of J. R. Miller was in May of 1967. 
According to the defendant's version of the facts 
he was at the Deseret Inn Motel and wrote the check 
in question for the payment of his bill. (T-79) He had 
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ooened the account involved in the summer of 
i 965, but was unaware of its being closed until Jan-
uary, 1968, when a M:r. Glad informed him the ac-
count was closed. (T-80) However, the defendant 
had received a check for $347 previous to January 
16, 1968, and having endorsed the same asked Mr. 
Glad to deposit $?.00 i:1 the account and bring the 
balance of cash to him. 
Mr. Miller endeavored to inform the court and 
jury what he believed had happened to the mortey 
and why it was not deposited but was denied an op-
portunity to do so. See proceedings (T-83-85). · 
Defendant submitted two instructions bearing 
on the question of intent to defraud, (T-26, 27) which 
the court refused to give, to which counsel duly ex-
cepted. IT-102) 
ISSUE I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS INVOLVING INTENT TO DEFRAUD AS RE-
LATED TO THIS CASE. 
By the terms of 76-20-11 Utah Code Ann. 1953 
(as a.mended) it is for any person, with in-
tent to defraud, to utter a check when at the draw-
ing of such check he knows he has not sufficient 
funds to pay the draft in full upon its presentation 
for payment. It is recognized in the State of Utah 
that the mere fact funds are not in an account at the 
writing of a check, though prima facie evidence of 
intent, is not conclusive evidence of an intent to de-
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fraud, and efforts by a defendant to place funds to 
cover the draft at the time of presentment may be 
considered tc negate the presumption of intent to de-
fraud. State t'. Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 406 P.2d 308 
(1965) The instructions given by the court imply that 
the writing of a check at a time one realizes his ac-
count has not the amount of funds written in the 
draft is all that is necessary in the crime of insuf-
ficient funds. Defendant's instructions would have 
properly clarified the law as stated in Coleman, supra 
and informed the jury of its duty to consider de-
fendant' s attempt to meet his obligation on the draft; 
a failure to give the same was error. 
In Coleman, supra the Supreme Court dismissed a 
conviction against defendant for an insufficient 
funds check where the evidence showed defendant 
placed funds in his acocunt to cover a check after 
it was written, though the funds were inadequate at 
the time of presentment. However, the court did 
recognize that the trial court's instruction to the jury, 
that one who had no funds and knowledge of no 
funds at the writing of the check was guilty of the 
crime, was an improper statement of the law. In 
the instant case, the defendant offered evidence of 
efforts to place funds in the bank to cover the check 
written. However, the courts instructions involving 
this offense as set forth in numbers 9, 10, and 11, 
(T-19, 20, 21 respectively) when read together leave 
the impression that a lack of funds and a knowledge 
of such lack of funds at the time of the writing of the 
draft is all that is required for the offense. Paragraphs 
3 and 4 of instruction 11 make reference to ". . . the 
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payment of said check upon its presentation at said 
bank ... "; however, each paragraph is referenced to 
paragraph 1, which sets forth the time of the writing, 
and consequently, it is not clear whether the jury 
should or m-:iy consider all the factors involved, in-
cluding those occurring after the writing of the draft. 
Had the court gra_nted defendant's requested in-
structions T-26 and 27, it would have been clear to 
the jury that defendant's story, if believed, could 
h0ve beer;. considered to negate the presumption 
of intent to defraud. However because of the court's 
failure to so do, the jurv was left with an erroneous 
impression of the law i.e. that mere lack of funds 
and knowledqe thereof at the time of writing con-
stitutes the crime. Certainly this is not the law in 
Utah. State v. Coleman, supra. 
ISSUE II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY AS TO INFORMA-
TION HE RECEIVED REGARDING HIS CHECKING 
ACCOUNT IN THAT SUCH TESTIMONY WAS OF-
FERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING DE-
FENDANT'S CONDUCT AND NOT TO ASSERT THE 
TRUTH OF THE STATEMENTS MADE. 
As a general rule of evidence, involving hear-
say, one may not testify as to non-judicial statements 
of others where such assert the truth of the state-
ment made. 29 Arn. Jur. 2d 555, § 497. However, where 
one seeks to give evidence of another's statement to 
explain his conduct and good faith in relation to 
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that statement, such is regarded as original and ma. 
terial evidence, and the same is not hearsay, and 
is admissable. Allsfote lns11ran.ce Co. v. Godwin, 426 
S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App. 1968); Thruway Service City Inc. 
v. Townsend. 116 Ga. App. 379, 157 S.E.2d 564 (1967); 
31A C,J.S. 676, 6'77 § 257; Jones on Evidence, Civil 
Cases, 3rd Ed. § 330. During the course of trial de-
fendant Miller attempted to explain what informa-
tion he received about his checking account to ex-
plain not only his state of mind at the time of the 
writing but also to explain his conduct following the 
receipt of such information. (T-83-85) The court's re-
fusal to allow such testimony was error and prejudi-
cial to the defendant's case. 
In Allstate Insurance Co. supra, plaintiff at trial was 
allowed to testify, over defendant's objection, that 
her supervisor had explained plaintiff's medica-1 ex-
penses, resulting from an on-the-job injury, would 
be covered. Such was entered by plaintiff to ex-
plain her reason for waiting several months before 
cornmencing an action for damages against de-
£endant insurance company. On appeal, the court 
of appeals upheld the admissibility of the plaintiff's 
testimony as to another's statement and adopted the 
rule of Jones on Evidence, Civil Cases, 3rd Ed.§ 330: 
Where the question is whether a party has acted 
prudently, wisely, or in good faith, the informa-
tion on which he acted, whether true or false, 
is original and material evidence, and not hear-
say. 
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Plaintiff's testimony as to phone conversations 
held with defendant's agents following damage to 
plaintiff's truck, caused by negligence of defendant's 
agents, was held 6.dmissable in Thruway Ser,vice City 
Inc., supra, to explain plaintiff's conduct, and was 
ruled not to be hearsay. Defendant"s agents had 
filled plaintiff's diesel truck with gasoline, and plain-
tiff was allowed to show he had his engine torn 
down for an estimation of damage at the suggestion 
of defendant's agents. In 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 257 
pp. 676-677, the following is found: 
Where a person's knowledge of a particular fact 
is relevant, it may be shown that an unswom 
statement of another person as to its existence 
was brought to his attention in the same way 
that any other relevant statement may be 
shown to have been made to him. . . . A wit-
ness may testify as to statements made to him 
by another, to establish lack of knowledge of 
the witness as to certain matters. 
Defendant was deprived of an opportunity to 
explain his good faith at the time of writing the 
check in question, or in other words to explain how 
he first learned his account was closed. Further, he 
was denied the chance to explain the information 
he received regarding his account which in tum 
would clarify his subsequent conduct. Based upon 
thi:: authorities cited, such evidence was material and 
0 dmlssable, and to deny its admissibility was error. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoin.g reasons defendant's convic-
tion should be reversed, the sentence set aside, and 
a new trial awarded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAY V. BARNEY 
231 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
